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Introduction 
Global Crossing is a company established in the United States. It was and still is a 
giant in the world of telecommunications. The company suffered a crisis in the early 
two thousands in having to face USA bankruptcy protection law (Chapter 11). However, 
Global Crossing is now one of the most powerful multinationals in the sector and 
recently conquered the Latin American market by acquiring IMPSAT, which was the 
largest telecommunications company in America (North, Central and South America)2. 
This means that Global Crossing is the owner of the largest network in the globe with 
subsidiaries registered in twenty six countries3, and fifty locations all over the world4. 
Global Crossing provides a wide range of services which include the value added 
services, the telecommunication services and information security. 
In the digital era, communication services have become essential and the fall of a 
massive company such as Global Crossing can destabilize the market, the systems 
and increase the prices of telecommunication services. Therefore, the lessons learnt 
from the bankruptcy debacle are indispensable for avoiding a second fall not only in 
Global Crossing, but in other telecommunication companies that might have been 
                                                 
 Este artículo fue presentado a la revista el día 3 de julio de 2008 y fue aceptado para su 
publicación por el Comité Editorial el día 28 de noviembre de 2008, previa revisión del concepto 
emitido por el árbitro evaluador. 
1
 Abogada de la Universidad Externado de Colombia. LLM en Derecho Internacional de los 
Negocios de la Universidad de Liverpool, Reino Unido. 
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 CARDENAS A. “Global Crossing adquiere a IMPSAT por $336 millones.” (Global Crossing 
Acquires IMPSAT for $336 millions). Optical IP news. Peru, October the 26
th
 2006 
http://www.opticalip.com.pe/newsblog/?p=31 
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 Global Crossing web Site: http://www.globalcrossing.co.uk/company/company_locations.aspx 
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using the same spurious practices which led Global Crossing to the crisis investigated 
in this study. 
This essay aims firstly to recall and analyze the Corporate Governance failures that led 
to the crisis and some of the most remarkable mistakes. Secondly, it intends to 
produce an in depth analysis of the governance policies that were produced after the 
crisis to conclude if they will be effective in preventing future financial catastrophes.  
Global Crossing certainly happened to have most of the failures in governance that it is 
possible to conceive of, and the most significant of these will be addressed deeply. The 
others will only be mentioned in terms of the most up-to-date legal debates regarding 
how to effectively prevent governance failures. 
Before continuing ahead with the facts and analysis of the case, it is important to 
review the concept of corporate governance and its fundamental principles. This will 
provide a better understanding of the issues raised in the case and will also encourage 
the reader to have a critical view of the ideas proposed in this text. 
a. Corporate Governance, what it is, what it should be, what it has to be 
done. 
The concept of corporate governance is not an homogeneus idea amongst the 
doctrine, mainly because of the structural differences in the companies themselves. It 
is also not a neutral academic creation in that Corporate Governance has a clear 
objective which is to prevent the agency problem (i.e., provide protection to certain 
participants of the business activity5 from the potential abuses of others), and thus the 
concepts vary according to the position of the person providing the definition.  
There is, however a common notion that underlies in all the different definitions, which 
is that certain specific governance practices are necessary (although not sufficient) to 
avoid undetected corporate catastrophes.  
In its very origins, the concept of Corporate Governance had three objectives: 
The first one was to protect the shareholders against the abuses of the directors and 
managers. Secondly, to bound the decisions of the company to the interest of the 
shareholders. And thirdly, to clarify that in all cases of conflicts of interest, the 
shareholders interests should prevail6. This is under the idea that shareholders are the 
providers of funds suppliers in the company and need a way of protecting their  
investment7.  
                                                 
5
 BAQUERO, Mauricio.  “El gobierno societario y de la empresa en Colombia. Una herramienta 
(Contractual) o un requisito (normativo)”. XXIII  Congreso de Derecho Comercial. Cámara de 
Comercio de Medellín para Antioquia, Colegio de Abogados de Medellín y Universidad 
Externado de Colombia. Medellin, Octubre de 2006. P. 1. 
6
 Supra N. 4 P. 2 
7
 SHELIFER AND VISHNY. “A Survey of Corporate Governance” The journal of finance. Vol 52 
No. 2  1997 p. 737 
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That concept has evolved according to different political systems, and also with the 
changing of the companies themselves. Also it has been transformed by the influence 
of companies in society and the social impact of the corporate failures.  
When big crises have risen in the corporate world, it has been clear that despite being 
the most affected, shareholders are not the only ones in need for protection. This has 
given space for the concept of stakeholders8 and the extension of the main objectives 
of corporate governance to them. Also, the increasing awareness of the huge power 
held (and sometimes abused, by companies), has been the key to open the door to 
other concepts such as corporate social responsibility.  
Stakeholders’ interests are not always the same as the ones of shareholders as the 
main interest of shareholders is to create profits from the company. Instead, and 
depending on the specific stakeholder, these interest can vary in several ways and can 
even be in conflict with the shareholders main objective9. 
This has also transformed the concept of Corporate Governance, at least in its 
objectives. Currently, even though there is still not a clear and universal definition, it 
can be stated that Corporate Governance is a set of practice intended to obtain the 
following objectives: 
-Strategic Focus  
- Predictability  
- Transparency  
- Participation  
- Accountability  
- Efficiency & Effectiveness 
- Stakeholder Satisfaction10 
b. Fundamental Principles. 
There are two important papers to which we must make reference to in examining the 
Fundamental Principles. In 2004, the OECD published a paper of “Revised Principles” 
which aimed to 'help develop a culture of values for professional and ethical behaviour 
on which well functioning markets depend'11. Following from this the White Paper on 
Corporate Governance in Latin America was developed to deal with specific 
charactaristics of the region. Examples of such issues include the influencial role of 
certain large companies in the development of the industry (eg Global Crossing), and 
an increased amount of family owned businesses in the region compared to other 
                                                 
8
 Stakeholders are the people who has an interest on the company but do not hold shares i.e. 
workers, surrounding community, the environment protector, creditors and consumers 
9
 PEREZ C. Elena. Corporate Governance: Shareholders Interests and other Stakeholders 
interests. Corporate ownership & Control. V. 4 Issue 4, Virtus Interpress. Summer 2007 P. 6. 
10
 Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. (The Cadbury Report). The Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance and Gee. 1992. 
11
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2004. 
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comparable areas. These (and other) factors heighten the need for effective corporate 
governance to ensure transparency and protect both shareholders and stakeholders in 
general. 
The Revised Principles of Corporate Governance have been compiled into a non 
binding set of principles by the OECD, which takes into account the objectives of 
corporate governance. Due to their non-binding nature, there is no regional 
requirement to enforce the principles. However they do provide a solid base for 
goverments and companies to either use as their own or expand upon within their 
particular circumstances. They also serve as a reference point when the debate on 
corporate governance arises. 
It is important to mention that the Revised Principles were published in 2004 as a 
response to the past corporate crises of major companies around the world, and they 
contain deep analyses on the actions that should be taken in order to prevent future 
corporate failure. 
The OECD Principles are summarised into six main groupings. These are: 
1) Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework. 
2) The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions. 
3) The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders. 
4) The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance. 
5) Disclosure and Transparency. 
6) The Responsibilities of the Board. 
The White Paper is also a non-binding document developed through four rounds of 
meetings by 8 Latin American countries and various other stakeholders12. The paper 
assesses the importance of good corporate governance, addresses the regional 
characteristics13 and reform priorities and then provides a framework of constructive 
recommendations. 
Possibly the most important aspects of the paper are the priorities identified as these 
are the principles to which the recommendations aim to rectify and would also be the 
basis of any separate governance codes which may be developed by a country or 
entity without reference to the recommendations provided. 
The priorities are listed as follows: 
                                                 
12
 Stakeholders included the OECD, the USA, Spain, UK, World Bank, IMF and various other 
international organisations. 
13
 Specific regional characteristics mentioned include Privatisation, Concentration of Ownership, 
Defined Control and the Need for Capital, Importance of Industrial Groups, Restructuring of 
Banking Systems, Regionalisation, Internationalisation, and the Importance of Multinational 
Enterprises, Limited Domestic Capital Markets and Growing Importance of Foreign Listings, 
Mandatory Privately-Managed Pension Schemes and Legal Traditions and Enforcement 
Patterns. 
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1) Taking Voting Rights Seriously. 
2) Treating Shareholders Fairly during Changes in Corporate Control and De-
listings. 
3) Ensuring the Integrity of Financial Reporting and Improving the Disclosure of 
Related Party Transactions. 
4) Developing Effective Boards of Directors. 
5) Improving the Quality, Effectiveness and Predictability of the Legal and 
Regulatory Framework. 
6) Continuing Regional Co-operation. 
These priorities are then to be implemented using the given recommendations. Whilst 
extensive guidance is given on each item of the recommendations with various 
subheadings, they can be summarised into the following broad categories: 
1) The Rights of Shareholders. 
2) The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders. 
3) The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance. 
4) Disclosure and Transparency. 
5) The Responsibilities of the Board. 
6) Improving Compliance and Effective Enforcement. 
7) Regional Co-operation. 
 
1. The Facts 
To provide an in depth analysis of the legal situation in Global Crossing’s case and, 
more specifically of the corporate governance failures, it is necessary to briefly review 
the facts that converted a wealthy company into a prey for a cheap acquisition which 
proved very profitable after a short time. 
Because this is intended to be a legal overview of the Corporate Governance situation, 
the numbers will be omitted in order to make the text more understandable and as 
simple as possible. However, it is important to recall that the numbers that powered the 
administration changes are the consequence of the Governance failures that will be 
mentioned during the development of the study. 
Global Crossing was established in 1997 by Gary Winnick and three business 
associates through Pacific Capital Group14. From 1997 until 2002, Winnick held the title 
of chairman; Lodwrick Cook, was hired 1998 as co-chairman15. John Scanlon became 
Global Crossing's first CEO in 1998. In February of 1999, he was replaced by Robert 
                                                 
14
 “Pacific Capital Group, Inc. ("PCG") was founded in 1985 by Gary Winnick and has been a 
leading principal equity investor and merchant banking firm. PCG provides capital to global 
companies in the telecommunications, technology, internet, media, real estate and healthcare 
sectors. PCG was the founder of Global Crossing, Ltd.” http://www.vclocator.com/Venture-
Capital/01152/Pacific-Capital-Group-Inc..html  
15
 “The Rise and Fall of Global Dreams," New York Times, March 3, 2002 
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Annunziata, who resigned his position as president of AT&T's business services group 
to become Global Crossing’s CEO. AT&T was a competitor of Global Crossing, but at 
the time, it was much bigger and more powerful than the new company. Annunziata 
pushed the overwhelming growth of the company by making ambitious acquisitions of 
other companies and large investments in infrastructure16. In the year of 1999, “The 
final major play the company underwent this year was a three way venture between 
Microsoft, Softbank, and Global Crossing to create Global Crossing Asia. This 
company would allow for the Asian market to rapidly gain access to new and better 
telecom services”17. Despite the growth of the company, in March 2000 Annunziata 
resigned. 
After Annunziata’s resignation, Leo Hindery was put in charge of the company. During 
Hindery’s short administration (seven months) Global Crossing saw its highest peak in 
the stock price. The constant changes of CEO are thought to be due to apparent 
conflicts between the company’s chairman Gary Winnick and the directors.  
During Hindery’s administration some hints of the crisis to come appeared. The 
company started attempting to obtain funding from stock offerings and selling assets. 
However, projections suggested the company would have a positive cash flow by early 
2002. Those projections never materialised. 
After Hindery left the company in 2000 (also because of conflicts with Winnick) the 
place of CEO was taken by Thomas Casey. Under Casey’s administration the 
company consolidated its main networks. These networks allowed them to expand their 
business globally. Nonetheless, the company was not fundamentally sound and 
despite the expansion the stock plummeted and in November 2001 the company 
entered into Chapter 11. Some of the company’s assets (particularly in Global 
Crossing's Asian operations) were finally sold to Asia Netcom. 
John Legere took the position of CEO of the company in October 2001. He managed 
the crisis, helped the company emerge from Chapter 11, and still occupies the position 
of CEO. Global Crossing’s bankruptcy is considered one of the biggest ten in the 
United States of America. 
2. What went wrong? 
In Global Crossing’s case the causes of the crisis were multiple. Some of them were 
related to corporate governance, but the truth is that the whole sector of 
telecommunications was going through difficulties because “of the changes in 
technology and decrease in the economy”18. The changes of technology obliged the 
companies to adjust quickly, and this led to financial trouble for those who could not 
cope with such adjustments. 
                                                 
16
 During Annunziata’s period, Global crossing acquired Frontier Corp, and “Global Marine”, 
amongst other companies. The company also grew in number of workers in a rate of more than 
50% 
17
 NORTON, VANDINE, KERNS. Case on Global Crossing. May 29
th
 2002.  P. 2 
http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~an169700/esp/case.htm   
18
 Supra Note 13 P. 3 
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Additionally, Global Crossing executives “severely overestimated the demand for their 
networks.”19 The worldwide telecommunication crisis lowered the need for broadband, 
which was one of the company’s biggest products. Also, unwise decisions about the 
position of the undersea cable created a lack of clients for this service.20 This 
submarine cable network was one of the largest investments made by Global Crossing, 
but the investment did not produce the return expected because there were not enough 
clients (with financial capacity to pay for, at least, the net cost of the services) in the 
area where it was installed. 
Despite these considerations, it can be stated that corporate governance mistakes 
were significant in escalating the crisis. Even if the lack of experience and excess of 
ambition harmed the company, the bankruptcy was driven by the spurious practices of 
the chief executives and the accountancy team as will be noted in the rest of this 
essay. 
2.1. The  board 
Decisions like taking on billions of US Dollars in debt to build an undersea fiber-optic 
cable system that now only represents 20% of all undersea capacity leaving the U.S.21 
were overly ambitious and unrealistic about the real financial capacity of the company. 
The approval of those decisions shows that there was no genuinely independent 
advisor on the board. 
Regarding this case, it is important to stop and consider whether an independent 
executive would have helped the situation. Within Global Crossing, Gary Winnick had a 
huge and charismatic power base as a non executive chairman. The ambitions of the 
company were his ambitions, and subsequently, the mistakes in these decisions were 
his mistakes. It is not likely that any board would have had the power to stop the 
decisions that he had encouraged with such great enthusiasm, even if it did contain 
experts. Essentially, whilst he may have been non-executive, Gary Winnick was 
certainly not independent. 
On the other hand, it is evident that Global Crossing used poor, if not criminal, 
accounting practices. Therefore, the manipulations on the balance sheet could easily 
have been hidden even from members of the board in order to pursue the over 
ambitious economic goal that the founder of the company had for his company. 
One of the big contradictions in Global Crossing’s case is that the chairman (Gary 
Winnick) was not found liable (amongst other reasons studied in the following sections) 
in the bankruptcy case due to not having enough involvement in the company’s day to 
day operations22.This was despite his huge influence on the company’s policies.  
As can be seen by the number of CEOs that passed through the company in a very 
short time, even chief executives had to maintain a good relationship with Winnick. 
Otherwise, the situation would become unbearable, forcing the executives to resign. 
                                                 
19
 Supra Note 13 P. 4 
20
 Supra Note 13 P.5 
21
 DENNIS K. BERMAN, PHILLIP DAY and HENNY SENDER. “Global Crossing Files for 
Chapter 11, Plans to Reorganize With Asia Firms”. The Wall Street Journal. January 27 2002  
22
 TAUB S. “No Charges for Global Crossing’s Winnick”. CFO.com. December 14 2004 
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In conclusion, Global Crossing’s board was not powerful enough to contradict Gary 
Winnick’s ideas. In this case, the separation of personalities between the company and 
its founders was only formal. The chief executives followed the example of their 
chairman in making the most (for themselves) out of the company. This involved 
obtaining economic benefits for the company without thinking critically about the 
ventures in which the company was getting involved. The corporate governance issue 
in this area was that the board was not independent from the founder; therefore, the 
members were looking for personal benefits instead of the benefit of the company. This 
clearly shows how the agency problem of shareholders interests had failed and the 
directors were no longer acting as stewards of the business on the shareholders' 
behalves. 
Finally, the main error of the board is that they did not perceive that the management of 
the company was poor, even though they had access to the information that the 
company was not making any money in the business of telecommunications. Indeed, 
they took the decision to get the money needed to operate out of other transactions, 
both in the stock market and the publicity sector. When a company does not make 
money in their own operations, cash flows quickly become problematic and eventually 
(even if none of the other corporate failures are present) the company runs out of the 
funds necessary to keep operating. 
 
a. The director’s remuneration, insider trading, speculation, fraud? 
One of the factors that brought instability to Global Crossing was the directors' and 
executives’ remuneration which included loans, stock options and excessive bonuses. 
More specifically, the insider trading by the executives probably led to an increased 
volatility of the stock market affecting people’s perception of the company, and thus 
their decisions to buy or sell stock23. 
The directors knew that the company was undergoing a crisis and did nothing about it 
but make money from it while enhancing fallacious speculations. This was a breach of 
their duties to avoid conflicts of interest and promote the success of the company. 
However, it is difficult to establish exactly what fault they are guilty of because there is 
no single action that constitutes the breach, but repeated practices and several 
measures that eventually could be justified as business strategies. Also, it is hard to 
draw the line between a criminal action and a simple breach of duties. 
Gary Winnick, the founder and Chairman of the company from its establishment until 
the filing of Chapter 11, was investigated by the FBI on cases of fraud24 because of 
suspicious accounting maneuvers like revenue acceleration25. As the leader of Global 
Crossing, he was the wizard that magically sold more than US $600 millions in Global 
                                                 
23
 Heather Milkiewicz and Shang-Jin Wei. A Global Crossing for Enronitis?: How Opaque Self-
Dealing Damages Financial Markets around the World. Brookings Review, Vol. 21 Spring 2003 
24
 PALAZZO A. “Winnick case has path of obstacles in way of officials.(Global Crossing Ltd. 
Chairman Gary Winnick)”. Los Angeles Business Journal. 21 Oct 2002. 
25
 WAYMAN R.  “Cooking The Books 101”. Investopedia ®  “One way to accelerate revenue is 
booking lump-sum payment as current sales when services will be provided over a number of 
years.” http://www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/071502.asp 
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Crossing stock26. He was also the person selling his stock and profiting from it when 
the company was struggling27. 
His attitude was, at least, a breach of the Director’s Fiduciary Duties (if not outright 
fraud). Furthermore, his actions were severely negligent and possibly even malicious. 
He was the company’s non executive chairman, and his attitude was imitated by the 
rest of the chief executives who obtained benefits from their stock options while the 
telecommunication crisis was hitting the sector and the company was having trouble 
finding business.  
Selling stock of a company during hard times is not a crime; in fact, the stock options 
for the executives seem to have had no other purpose than to provide incentives to the 
executives. However, good practice by the executives (not only in the management of 
the company but in the use of their stock options) is fundamental to avoid a major 
crisis. In this case, it would have been better to link such incentives to performance 
over fixed periods of time, and to maintain them on condition of the continued good 
financial health of the company. 
The undue trading in the stock could have also been avoided with a more transparent 
system of insider trading. This would have involved publicizing the transactions that the 
executives made with their stock. Such preventive measures have been successfully 
applied under the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United States and also exists in different 
codes of good corporate practices28 such as the Combined Code of Principles of Good 
Governance and Code of Best Practice used in the United Kingdom29. 
2.2. The Creditors 
a. The banks 
The crisis would not have occurred if creditors had been aware of the crisis to come in 
the sector. Negligent investment played a significant role in the bankruptcy. Dan Cohrs, 
Global Crossing's Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, says that 
“Global Crossing's vision of a global fiber optic network was endorsed and supported 
by the equity and debt markets, throwing literally billions of dollars at the company 
through debt and equity issues”.30 
To what extent the creditors were responsible is a question which the doctrine has not 
answered unanimously. In ideal conditions, investors would have an accurate 
knowledge of the financial situation of the company on which they could base their 
                                                 
26
 PALMRI and WEINTRAUB. As Global Crossing Sinks, Gary Winnick Stays Dry. Business 
Week magazine. Oct 22 2001. 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_43/b3754058.htm  
27
 PALAZZO A. Sincerity of Winnick's $25 million pledge questioned - Up Front - Global 
Crossing Ltd. case - Brief Article. Los Angeles Business Journal.  07 Oct 2002. 
28
 Such Act and Codes were issued and implemented after the big corporate crisis, and as a 
result of them.  
29
 THE COMBINED CODE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CODE OF BEST 
PRACTICE S. 1 (A5) (B2) (D3). 
30
 Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc. GLOBAL CROSSING BANKRUPTCY NEWS, V. 24. First 
Issue, January 2002. http://bankrupt.com/global.txt 
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projections and analysis. If this had happened, the investors simply would not have put 
their money into such a risky business. 
However, it is necessary to emphasize that the source of information on which creditors 
base their analysis is none other than that provided by the company itself. They 
produce an analysis of the possible consequences of investing based on the 
company’s financial statements. Therefore, it is very difficult to appoint liability to the 
creditors for wrongfully allocating resources to companies that do not meet the 
requirements, if their primary source contains manipulation of the financials, and other 
sorts of “accounting tricks”. These will mislead whoever reads them, even if that reader 
is an expert financial analyst. 
In Global Crossing’s case, it is true that the banks poured money into a worthless 
company, and this created the enormous debt that triggered the crisis. However, 
excessive granting of credit was not a cause of the crisis, but rather a symptom of it. 
This means that even if the creditors who put their money into Global Crossing had not 
done so, the company would have secured alternative sources of money (either by 
investing or credit) through manipulation in the same manner. However, it must be 
noted that creditors are required to provide stricter controls in risk management 
precisely because of the nature of their activity. 
2.3 The Investors 
The spiral of the lack of income caused from the poor performance in business led the 
company to take on debts that they were unable to cover with revenues. There were 
two actions taken by the board that accelerated the fall and resulted in bankruptcy. 
Firstly, they used poor accountancy practices and secondly, they obtained a level of 
credit that the company was eventually unable to repay. 
The investors’ role in this case was not incidental; they had the expertise and the tools 
available to find out the real situation of the company. Their negligence can be classed 
as one of the causes of the problem. Nonetheless, it is necessary to remember that in 
doing business, the presumption of contracting parties is that the other party is an 
honest trader. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to demand from investors an 
exhaustive investigation of the sources of information. It is reasonable to assume that 
they believed the information provided by the company was correct. However, 
dishonesty was noticeable by its absence in some of the investments made in Global 
Crossing, as was the case with pension funds. 
a. Indirectly investing: Pension Funds 
Pension funds also had investments in another company which at the same time 
wrongfully invested in Global Crossing and were seriously affected by the crisis. More 
specifically, “Ullico, a privately held insurance company which is owned largely by 
unions and their pension funds, was an early major investor in Global Crossing and its 
directors used the telecom’s volatile stock price history to personally enrich themselves 
at the expense of the union members and retirees whose pension funds own Ullico”31. 
                                                 
31
 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-
Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives. 
Ullico And Global Crossing: The Tip of the Union Pension Fund Scandal Iceberg. Presented by 
Kenneth F. Boehm, Chairman. National Legal and Policy Center. May 1st 2002.  
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 7, Número 2 (2008) 
 
11 
 
The diligence of Ullico’s investors is questionable, since Gary Winnick offered them a 
great deal with the availability of the stock, likely too much not to be somewhat 
suspicious.32 
Also, it was proven that Ullico’s directors obtained a benefit from the early investment 
made in the company and they also had stock options of Global Crossing which they 
used to obtain cash flow when their own company was not doing well in business33. 
Ullico’s situation seems to have replicated the very situation that led Global Crossing to 
bankruptcy, but on a smaller scale. 
Ullico’s directors deliberately exposed the pensions to a high risk by supporting an 
investment that was bad for the fund under an undercover agreement34 from which they 
obtained personal benefits. This can have many legal definitions, like breach of the 
duty of avoiding conflicts of interest and fraud, but to put it simply it was corruption. The 
manner in which the investment (and therefore, the debt of Global Crossing that 
eventually lead to bankruptcy) could have been avoided was simply by acting honestly. 
There is no legal formula for that, sunshine is the best disinfectant35. It should be noted 
that Ullico’s high executives were investigated and found liable for their breach of 
duties.36  
2.4 The Gatekeepers 
Global Crossing’s accountants and auditors were not only aware of the problem, but 
also added to it. They neglected to alert the board or the authorities to the bad 
consequences that the Company was going to suffer as a result of the speculations 
and manipulations that they were also contributing to. 
Firstly, acknowledging that the company was not receiving money from its operations, 
the internal accountants started practising revenue acceleration37. This was either 
noticed by the auditors, (in which case they surprisingly did not think that it was a 
reason to blow the whistle, as they did not take any action to prevent it), or it went 
unnoticed which is even more dramatic, as it shows their ineptitude for performing the 
task for which they were hired. 
The auditor (Arthur Andersen) has also been involved in other company collapses 
(WorldCom, Enron)38. Whilst it is true that they were not found guilty of fraud in any of 
                                                 
32
 Notice the double corporate governance failure: 1. pension funds did not track the 
investments made by the companies they owned, 2. Managers of the second company were 
effectively bribed by GC directors in a perfect combination leading to great losses for the 
Pension Funds. 
33
 Supra, note 26 
34
 Supra Note 23 
35
 Supra, Note 26.  
36
 Supra Note 23 
37
 One of the most common forms of revenue acceleration is to include in the balance sheets as 
revenues for the term accounted, the revenues expected from signed contracts from which the 
payments have not been received yet. Therefore, the revenue is nonexistent, it is just a future 
expectation secured only by an agreement. 
38
 Precisely, Arthur Andersen went out of business because of these collapses that made it lose 
all credibility amongst clients and thus the company was dissolved. 
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these bankruptcies it remains at least suspicious that they could have been so blind to 
the irregularities in the accountancy that led these companies to file for Chapter 1139.  
In Global Crossing’s case, the gatekeepers’ failure was not the only cause of the 
problems because the company was not making generating cash anyway. 
Nonetheless, they could have prevented the company from getting into so much debt, 
which could have possibly avoided bankruptcy. Currently, the new regulations under 
the Sarbannes Oxley Act forbid revenue acceleration in the financials, thus ensuring 
that they are more realistic and once again encouraging transparency in companies’ 
transactions. 
3. Personal Liability, Criminal Liability? 
Directors of companies have specific duties that have been slowly decanted and 
codified around the world. This has happened not only in the USA but also in in 
Europe, and more precisely in the UK - the world’s financial center and where they 
were recently compiled in a code40. These duties arise because of the trust put in their 
preparation and experience in the business developed by the company. Breaching 
these duties can lead to personal liability of the directors. However, it is very hard to 
prove breaches of duty. For instance, it is extremely difficult to draw the line between 
an audacious business risk and a breach of the duty of skill and care. 
In Global Crossing’s case, the directors breached their duties (evidently, the duty of 
skill and care, and subject to proof, the duty of avoiding conflict of interest and 
promoting the success of the company). Hence a personal liability on the bankruptcy 
should have been imposed on them personally. The best way for executives to prevent 
themselves from ever being personally liable for corporate governance issues is simple 
(at least in theory). Directors that put in the time, pay attention, focus on the real issues 
and act in what they honestly believe to be in the best interest of the company and its 
shareholders as opposed to their own personal interest are very unlikely to be held 
personally liable for any decision41. 
The liability of Gary Winnick was also questioned as his actions were investigated by 
the criminal authorities of the United States. He was found not guilty because the 
Securities and Exchange Commission42 (SEC) could not find enough proof of fraud or 
insider trading43, but the SEC made some interesting findings. 
Firstly, they found that “executives failed to provide regulators with adequate disclosure 
about certain, critical swap transactions44”. Secondly, the SEC established that “the 
                                                 
39
 COFEEE J. Gatekeepers. The professions and corporate governance. OUP 2006 page 47. 
40
 UK Companies Act 2006 sections 170- 177. 
41
 CASPERIE J. Inside the Minds: Corporate Governance Law. WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH 
& ROSATI Professional Corporation. Aspatore Books. USA. P. 6. 
42
 The Securities and Exchange Commission is an agency pertaining to the FBI intended to 
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
43
 TAUB S. No Charges for Global Crossing’s Winnick. CFO.com. December 14 2004. 
44
 Supra Note 38. 
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accounting for the transactions was wrong but wasn't done with intent to commit 
fraud45.”  
4. The Law, The policy 
As a result of bankruptcies due to corporate governance failures, the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act was issued in October 2002 by the United States. This intended to protect national 
investment in foreign countries, improve transparency in companies’ governance and 
prevent new debacles such as the ones experienced by some of the biggest 
companies of the USA including Enron, WorldCom and, of course, Global Crossing.  
Perhaps as a result of the paranoia generated by the multiple crises, the new 
regulations in Sarbanes Oxley Act were excessively broad. To mention only two of the 
most remarkable and excessive novelties, under the new regulations the CEO´s of 
foreign companies operating within the United States (and companies established 
outside the USA but with a major investment of American sources) were forced under 
the law “to accept personal criminal liability for the validity of their companies’ financial 
statements46”. Also the act made lawyers enter formally and with specific obligations 
into the gatekeepers’ category. Under these new provisions, lawyers face a dilemma 
between their professional duty to their clients and the new legal obligation of 
withdrawing from representing a corporate client if they detect fraud and the company 
doesn’t provide any remedies after the lawyer brings it to the attention of high-level 
officers47. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was both a token of the megalomania of the congress of the 
United States and a very strict reaction to a problem. Therefore, it might scare away 
valuable investment from the United States, which indeed occurred, also caused by 
other measures such as the Money Laundering regulations. However, it is a stringent 
position intended to enhance the transparency of the companies and has shown 
tangible results including the publicity of a company’s transactions, main investors, 
internal shareholders and their transactions. 
Conclusions 
It is relatively easy to spot the mistakes of a company after it has collapsed, but 
remains very hard to see them while the company is collapsing, and even more so, to 
foresee them when everything is apparently well. Fortunately for Global Crossing, the 
issues that led to Chapter 11 can be a tool to prevent such dangers in the future of the 
company because of these lessons of the past. There is no magic formula for avoiding 
financial problems, but at least good corporate governance practice can diminish their 
impact and prevent them from destroying the company. 
Global Crossing has been recovering rapidly from the crisis. They have already 
invested in substantial infrastructure and have started with a company free from debt. 
The new opportunity given to this company is an exceptionally good chance to apply 
the lessons learnt from the previous crisis. 
                                                 
45
 Supra Note 38. 
46
 RHODE ISLAND SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
aims to fix old problems poses new ones. What Counts journal. Winter 2002 Vol. 1. No. 1  
47
 Supra Note 38 
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Currently, Global Crossing has a transparency policy intended to both meet the 
requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and to regain the confidence of clients and 
investors. This is going to be important in the future for preventing economic difficulties 
and from periods of recession causing liquidity problems or a large scale crisis as 
happened in the past.  
New acquisitions, ventures and investments must all be done with transparency, whilst 
taking fewer risks to ensure sound growth of the company (even if it is slower). 
Accounting practices need to be kept as strict as possible to avoid “inflated” balance 
sheets and reduce volatility of the stock market. 
Briefly, it can be said that Global Crossing incurred in the following governance failures: 
- Lack of independence of managers and board of directors from founders and 
stockholders. 
- Irresponsible investment: Ullico’s case. 
- Lack of transparency: insider trading. 
- Director’s remuneration not bound to performance and breach of duties. 
- Insider trading in detriment of the company’s interest. 
- Investors’ negligence: suspicious investment. 
- Banks irresponsible lending: excessive debt acquired underestimating real 
payment capacity. 
- Speculation. 
In summary, the strategies that must be put in place to avoid a future collapse (and that 
would have prevented the commented bankruptcy from happening) are: 
1. Transparency in Insider trade: because of the fact that high executives have the 
most up to date information on their company’s prospects48, transparency in the 
transactions they do with their stock is very important regarding early detection of a 
possible crisis. Heavy selling by one or both groups can be a sign of trouble ahead49, 
despite recommendations in other directions made by the analyst firms. 
2. In House lawyers: Transparency in contracts and legal documents is essential for 
tracking down authors of corporate mistakes and uncovering fraud when it occurs, 
although stock movements are not subject of revision from the in house lawyers, other 
important documents that might be a sign of unsound governance can be easily 
spotted by them. To prevent a crisis, the job of the in house lawyers is crucial because 
they revise the terms of all contracts signed by the company and have access to the 
board’s deliberations through the books. They can report any irregularity to the high 
executives, and under the Sarbanes Oxley act, they are not entitled, but obliged to stop 
giving legal advice if they consider that the company’s directors are not willing to fix the 
problems that they have spotted. 
3. Creditors: all creditors, but specially banks must revise deeply the company’s 
financial situation before agreeing to grant loans and financial support. A clean credit  
                                                 
48
 Supra Note 32 
49
 Supra Note 32 
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history will allow the bank to protect not only the resources of  its customers and the 
financial system itself, but also the company form spending more money than what it 
earns, and thus, from falling into insolvency or bankruptcy. 
4. Investors: responsible investment is the key of the XXIst century. The idea of the 
careless investor who only provides money and waits for results has been revaluated 
by the corporate crisis of the last decade. The new role that must be played by the 
investors is as active participants in the company’s activity. This will allow them to 
protect their money whilst vigilating the transactions. 
Global Crossing’s fall could have been avoided if the aspects studied through this text 
were taken into account. These lessons have been learnt by regulators all over the 
world, companies, investors and the public in general. In the coming recession it will be 
seen if the measures taken are enough and effective in preventing further corporate 
collapses. 
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